On November 22, 2019, the Department of Defense, General Services Administration and NASA presented a final Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) on Reporting of Nonconforming Items to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (FAR Case 2013-002). The FAR provision (FAR 46.317) and clause (FAR 52.246-26) are applicable to the Department of Defense and civilian agencies. This final rule requires contractors and subcontractors to report counterfeit or suspect counterfeit parts to GIDEP, starting in December of 2019.

History:

The FAR rule was first proposed in June of 2014 under FAR Case 2013-002 as a partial implementation to Section 818 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). After 5 years of deliberation and input from industry, the final rule was limited in scope and subsequently adopted in November of 2019 and became effective on December 23, 2019. Contractor participation that was voluntary in the past is now required.

Key Definitions from the FARⁱ:

Critical item means an item, the failure of which is likely to result in hazardous or unsafe conditions for individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the item; or is likely to prevent performance of a vital agency mission.

Counterfeit item means an unlawful or unauthorized reproduction, substitution, or alteration that has been knowingly mismarked, misidentified, or otherwise misrepresented to be an authentic, unmodified item from the original manufacturer, or a source with the express written authority of the original manufacturer or current design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer. Unlawful or unauthorized substitution includes used items represented as new, or the false identification of grade, serial number, lot number, date code, or performance characteristics.

Suspect counterfeit item means an item for which credible evidence (including but not limited to, visual inspection or testing) provides reasonable doubt that the item is authentic.

Critical nonconformance means a nonconformance that is likely to result in hazardous or unsafe conditions for individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the supplies or services; or is likely to prevent performance of a vital agency mission.

Major nonconformance means a nonconformance, other than critical, that is likely to result in failure of the supplies or services, or to materially reduce the usability of the supplies or services for their intended purpose.

Applicability:

The new rule applies to:

• Contractors and Subcontractors.
• The acquisition of items subject to higher-level quality standards (e.g. SAE AS5553, ISO 9001).
• Items determined to be “critical”.
• Electronic parts or items containing electronic parts, components or assemblies for the DoD that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold.
• Services provided in conjunction with the above (e.g. MROs are now required to report).

Requirements:

• Contractors are required to proactively screen GIDEP to avoid the use of counterfeit, suspect counterfeit and/or nonconforming items.
• Contractors must submit written notification to the Contracting Officer within 60 days of becoming aware or suspecting that the product being procured on behalf of the Government is counterfeit or suspect counterfeit and must retain the item unless otherwise directed by the Contracting Officer.
• Submit a report to GIDEP within 60 days of becoming aware that product is counterfeit or suspect counterfeit or a common item that has a major or critical nonconformance, regardless whether or not the item was delivered to the government customer.
• With regard to flow down, contractors are prohibited from altering the clause other than to identify relevant parties.

Exemptions:

• Contracts for the purchase of commercial items including COTS items.
• Contracts at or below the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT).
• Medical devices subject to FDA reporting requirements.
• Foreign corporations/partnerships that do not have an office, place of business or paying agent in the United States.
• Counterfeit, suspect counterfeit or nonconforming items part of an on-going criminal investigation, unless approved by the appropriate law-enforcement agency.
• Nonconforming items that have been confirmed by the manufacturer as not having been sold to more than one customer.

Issues/Concerns:

• On a recent webinar presented by ASCDINATD, Neil Vill and Keith Gregory highlighted a number of issues with the new FAR regulationⁱⁱ:
• The Government’s definition of counterfeit differs from industry standards such as SAE AS5553 as it includes unauthorized substitutions and used items represented as new.
• The definition of a critical item is also an item of concern as it is open to interpretation and is subject to the Contracting Officer’s discretion.
• Liability issues may arise. Reports may be challenged by suppliers, especially in the case of reputation damage and/or debarment.
• How GIDEP will deal with inaccuracies contained within reports is outside of the scope of the new rule. Inaccurate information could lead to libel, tortious interference and could be subject to damages.
• If a Contractor is not currently reporting to GIDEP, how do they gear up to do so?
• When preparing a GIDEP report, contractors need to take into consideration any non-disclosure agreements or confidential information.

Key Take-Aways:

• Contractors must confirm their GIDEP membership, or join if they are not already members, and have a designated GIDEP Representative.
• Contractors must ensure that current company processes address the proactive screening of GIDEP and reporting to GIDEP.
• Contractors should stringently note the date that they become aware of or suspect that an item is counterfeit to remain compliant with the 60-day notification requirement.
• Ensure that all data provided in a GIDEP report is factual and accurate. Contractors should ensure that relevant staff is trained on the preparation of GIDEP reports.
• Contractors should ensure open lines of communication to the Contracting Officer and to suppliers.
• Suppliers should review practices, policies and procedures to see how a counterfeit part was supplied and should address the steps taken to remedy the problem. This corrective action should be included as part of the supplier’s GIDEP response.

Click here to read the FAR rule in the Federal Register

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ⁱhttps://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-11-22/pdf/2019-24960.pdf
ⁱⁱASCDINATD Webinar, Final Federal Acquisition Regulation Rule Regarding the Reporting of Nonconforming Items to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), Neil Vill and Keith Gregory, December 9, 2019.

On September 5, 2019, Senators Thom Tillis, Bill Cassidy, Chris Coons and Mazie Hirono introduced S.2987 – Counterfeit Goods Seizure Act of 2019 in the United States Senate. If passed, the bill would allow U.S. Customs and Border Protection to seize imported products that violate design patent rights. Current law allows CBP to take action against product and packaging that violates a copyright or trademark (intellectual property rights infringements); however, this law would extend CBP’s powers to control product that violates design patent owner’s rights.

"Counterfeit products from China and other countries flood our country at an alarming rate. These products steal sales from American companies and damage the brands those companies have worked so hard to build. Even more concerning, counterfeit products put the health and well-being of American consumers at risk,” Senator Hirono said. “While Customs and Border Protection has the authority to seize products that infringe copyrights and trademarks at the border, it lacks this same authority for products that infringe a design patent. Counterfeiters exploit this loophole by importing counterfeit products separately from labels containing an infringing trademark, only attaching the label once the counterfeit product has cleared customs. The Counterfeit Goods Seizure Act of 2019 closes this loophole by giving CBP the authority to seize counterfeit products that infringe design patents at the border. This simple change will go a long way toward protecting American consumers and businesses from harm."ⁱ

According to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)’s response to the request for public comments on the report of the State of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods Trafficking and Recommendations 84 FR32861 (July 10, 2019), CBP noted an increase in the importation of “blank” semiconductors, i.e. “semiconductors that are being imported without any trademarks or logos on them, but that will likely thereafter be marked with fraudulent markings.” As these “blanks” contain no trademarks, CBP currently does not have the power to seize the parts due to the absence of a trademark, regardless if CBP suspects the parts are counterfeit. Under the proposed bill, CBP would be able to stop suspect counterfeit product if the product is determined to infringe on a design patent.

As the bill has bipartisan support in the Senate, there is a likelihood that the measure will become law. The legislation is being supported by the International Trademark Association (INTA), the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), and the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) who noted that the change would bring US policy into line with that of many US trading partners such as the EU, Japan, South Korea, China, India, Mexico and others. If set into law, it will be critical for design patent owners to register their rights with CBP for protection and to ensure that CBP officers receive proper training in identifying counterfeit product.

The bill has been referred to the US Senate Finance Committee for consideration.

Click here to read the proposed measure

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ⁱhttps://www.cassidy.senate.gov/newsroom/press- releases/cassidy- tillis- coons- hirono- introduce- bipartisan- legislation- to- seize- counterfeit- products- and- protect- american- consumers- and- businesses
ⁱⁱSubmission of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Request for Public Comments on Report on the State of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods Trafficking and Recommendations 84 FR 32861 (July 10, 2019).

Since 1961, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has been the law that specifies the annual budget of the US Department of Defense. This year’s bill provides a base budget of $658.4 billion, $71.5 billion for overseas contingency operations, and $5.3 billion for emergency disaster recovery to cover damages from extreme weather. The NDAA covers the restoration of military readiness, implements a national defense strategy to confront Russia, China and other threats, updates Pentagon business systems, provides support for military troops and their families and implements a sixth branch of the US Armed Forces, the Space Force.

Notable points relative to the electronics industry contained in H.R. 2500 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) are:

Section 230C Trusted Supply Chain and Operational Security Standards for Microelectronics:

Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish trusted supply chain and operational security standards for the purchase of microelectronics products and services by the Department by January 1, 2021. In developing standards, the Secretary must consult with suppliers of microelectronics products and services from the United States and its allies and partners along with representatives of major United States industry sectors that rely on a trusted supply chain. The Secretary can create tiers of trust and security within the supply chain and operational security standards for microelectronic products/services. The standard would be applicable to the trusted supply chain and would be used by the government and commercial industry to the greatest extent practicable. Commercial suppliers would be incentivized to sell commercial products that are produced on the same production lines as those supplied to the government.

Section 254 Funding for Anti-Tamper Heterogenous Integrated Microelectronics:

Increases funding for anti-tampering heterogenous integrated microelectronics by $5,000,000. Funds would be used for the research, development, test and evaluation of defense-wide advanced technology development.

Section 255 Briefing on Use of Blockchain Technology for Defense Purposes:

Requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to provide a briefing on the potential use of distributed ledger technology for defense purposes to improve cybersecurity, reduce single points of failure in emergency and catastrophe decision-making, improve the efficiency of defense logistics and supply chain operations, enhance the transparency of procurement auditing and allow innovations to be adapted by the private sector for ancillary uses.

Section 855 Supply Chain Risk Mitigation Policies to be Implemented Through Requirements Generation Process:

Amends the process for enhanced supply chain scrutiny by inserting a new paragraph, “Development of tools for implementing supply chain risk management policies during the generation of requirements for a contract.”

Read the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act

Tao Li

On October 16, 2019, Tao Li, aka Michael Wilson aka Richard Lee, a Chinese citizen, was sentenced to 40 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Li had pleaded guilty in April to conspiring to export military and space grade technology to China without a license in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Li was arrested in September of 2018 in Los Angeles International Airport after arriving from China. Li and other individuals in China had been attempting to purchase radiation hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits. Using different aliases, Li contacted various individuals in the US attempting to purchase the restricted components, including Intersil part numbers ISO705ARHVF and HS1-201HSRH-Q, TriQuint part number TGA2573-2, and Cobham part number UT28F256QLET. Li additionally offered to pay a 10% “risk fee” to have the components illegally exported to his company in Hong Kong. After wiring money from China to a secret undercover government bank account in Arizona, Li was arrested in transit to Arizona to meet with an undercover Homeland Security Investigations agent.

According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Li is currently incarcerated at CI Reeves I & II in Texas with an anticipated release date of August 1, 2021.

Additional information: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese- national- sentenced- 40- months- prison- conspiring- illegally- export- military- and- space


Saad Ahmed

On December 9, 2019, Saad Ahmed was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods. Ahmed, owner of PhonePartsUSA.com LLC, had pleaded guilty in September in a Southern District of California federal court.

Ahmed admitted to trafficking approximately $1.5 million of counterfeit cellular phone parts that bore fraudulent Samsung, Apple and UL trademarks. The vast majority of parts were purchased from overseas suppliers based principally in China. To avoid detection by CBP, the shipments containing counterfeit materials were separated from other shipments, counterfeit trademarks were obscured by protective stickers, and addresses and names to which counterfeit product was sent were manipulated in order to deflect detection.

Ahmed agreed to pay $269,681 in restitution to the trademark holders and forfeit 4,453 cell phone parts and accessories seized in June 2018 by Homeland Security Investigations. According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Ahmed is not currently in custody.

Additional information: https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/las- vegas- businessman- sentenced- prison- trafficking- more- 1- million- counterfeit


Zoulin Cai

On December 19, 2019, Zoulin Cai, aka Allen Cai, a Chinese citizen, was arrested pursuant to a federal grand jury three-count indictment for conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods and labels, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, and conspiracy to engage in money laundering.

According to the complaint, Cai was employed by Shenzhen Theseus Technology, aka Theseus Technology aka Everlasting Energy, a Chinese company allegedly owned by Cai’s relatives. The government contends that Theseus Technology manufactured counterfeit batteries, including laptop batteries, which were then exported to the United States to warehouses under Cai’s control and subsequently sold through online portals such as eBay and Amazon. The counterfeit batteries were falsely advertised as genuine product when in reality they bore counterfeit trademarks from Dell, Apple, HP, Toshiba and UL. According to Assistant US Attorney Tracy L. Wilkison, “the batteries involved in this case were sold to numerous unsuspecting online buyers, including one victim whose laptop started smoking and nearly caught fire after the battery was installed.” Cai and his co-conspirators received at least $23.8 million from the sale of counterfeit batteries from 2014 through June of 2019 and allegedly laundered more than $18 million directly to Chinese bank accounts in the name of Theseus Technology.

If convicted, Cai faces a maximum sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment.

Additional information: https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/chinese- national- arrested- 238- million- scheme- sell- counterfeit- laptop- computer- batteries

On November 7, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York announced various charges against Aventura Technologies, Inc. of Commack, New York, six current employees, and one former employee with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, unlawful importation, and money laundering conspiracy.

The defendants named in the complaint are: Aventura Technologies, Inc; Jack Cabasso, Aventura’s Managing Director; Frances Cabasso, Frank’s wife and listed CEO of Aventura; Jonathan Lasker, Director of Operations; Christine Lavonne Lazarus, Director of Business Development; Wayne Marino, Network Specialist; Eduard Matulik, Director of International Sales; and Alan Schwartz, a former Systems Engineering Manager, now retired.

According to the complaint, Aventura advertised itself as a manufacturer of security equipment (e.g. cameras, metal detectors) whose main customers are US government agencies including the US Army, US Navy and US Air Force. Since August 2006, Aventura sold approximately $20.7 million worth of security equipment to US government agencies, an estimated $16.9 million to the Department of the Treasury, and had a revenue of approximately $88 million from government and private sales since November 2010.

The government alleges that starting in August 2006, the defendants conspired with Chinese security equipment manufacturers to conceal the true origin of security equipment by falsely labeling Chinese-made equipment as product manufactured in the United States by Aventura. The government’s investigation uncovered that Aventura did not manufacture the products it sells as the company did not import typical raw materials commonly used by electronics manufacturers nor did it employ an adequate number of staff needed to produce the equipment. Instead, Aventura employees allegedly affixed “Made in the U.S.A.” labels on product imported primarily from China.

Moreover, Aventura did not disclose to US government agencies that the products they were purchasing were imported from China. These products were known to have security vulnerabilities that could permit hackers to assume remote control and obtain security data. These Chinese cameras were unknowingly installed on Army, Navy, Air Force and Department of Energy facilities, including Navy aircraft carriers. Aventura allegedly also deceived private customers who had paid a premium for American-made goods but instead received product with known cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities, of which Cabasso was aware. As evidence from the complaint showed, in 2016, Cabasso emailed a GSA contractor notifying them of rivals who were allegedly selling Chinese product as “Made in the USA” and pointed out the products had ‘significant cybersecurity issues aside from TAA’.




Source: US government’s criminal complaint


Examples of fraudulent sales to government agencies include:

1. In March 2019, the US Navy ordered a laser-enhanced night vision camera from Aventura that had been listed by Aventura as being American-made. One month later at JFK Airport in New York, CBP intercepted a shipment from a Chinese manufacturer destined to Aventura that contained a camera matching the one ordered by the Navy and placed a secret mark on the camera. Two weeks later the same camera bearing the secret mark was shipped by Aventura to a naval base in Groton, Connecticut.
2. In May of 2018, the US Air Force purchased body cameras for use by security personnel at a base. In August, a servicemember saw Chinese characters on the screen of a camera which was then sent to a specialist for analysis. Several indications were uncovered showing that the camera was manufactured in China including a logo of the PRC Ministry of Public Safety, a logo of the Chinese manufacturer and a US Air Force logo, all of which had been saved to the firmware on a computer set to a Chinese time zone.
3. In September of 2018, Aventura was awarded a contract by the Department of Energy for network-linked turnstiles and a glass partition wall for a Department facility in Tennessee. Aventura had advertised in the bid that, “we proudly manufacture in the U.S.A.”. In January 2019, CBP inspected a shipment from Zhejiang, China to Aventura containing turnstiles, which were once-again secretly marked. In February, the aforementioned turnstiles bearing the secret marks were received and inspected by Department of Energy investigative agents. On protective acrylic was found a note written in Chinese to which defendant Lazarus responded that the acrylic had been separately purchased from China which Aventura then installed in New York.

Additionally, the Cabassos, Lasker and Lazarus are also accused of misrepresenting Aventura as a woman-owned small business in order to obtain special government contracts. The government alleges that although Frances Cabasso is listed on paperwork as the CEO, in reality she did not have a managing role in the operation of Aventura and was, in fact, employed part-time at a Long Island accounting firm.

The Wall Street Journal reported on December 16, 2019 that Cisco Systems successfully secured a temporary injunction against four Chinese manufacturers it accuses of producing counterfeit versions of their networking equipment. The four manufacturers include: Shenzhen Tianheng Network Co., Gezhi Photonics Technology Co. Ltd., Shenzhen Sourcelight Technology Co., and Dariocom. Cisco argued that the counterfeit equipment posed a risk to national security and health systems as they were more prone to failure and would be difficult to update and maintain.

According to PCMag, “the four manufacturers in question are thought to account for over half of all counterfeit transceiver production.”ⁱ Through the freezing of assets of these corporations and blocking the sales of their products on shopping portals such as Amazon and eBay, the likelihood that organizations and consumers end up with counterfeit product is reduced.

The court’s decision follows recent moves by the US government and private companies against Chinese companies engaged in intellectual property theft. President Trump has recently taken steps to protect trade secrets as part of the first phase of a trade deal with China. The plan calls for China to submit an “Action Plan to strengthen intellectual property protection”, requires that technology transfers be based on “market terms that are voluntary and reflect mutual agreement”, and requires both nations to “strengthen cooperation and jointly and individually combat infringement and counterfeiting in the e-commerce market.”ⁱⁱ

Cisco’s attorney, Mark Chandler, told the Wall Street Journal, “we welcome the news that China will strengthen intellectual-property protections in the country…we have worked with Chinese authorities over the years to raid facilities and shut down counterfeiters.”

A permanent injunction is expected.

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ⁱhttps://www.pcmag.com/news/cisco- secures- injunction- against- chinese- counterfeiters
ⁱⁱhttps://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase one agreement/Economic_ And_ Trade_ Agreement_ Between_ The_ United_ States_ And_ China_ Text.pdf

TM-03: Counterfeit Inspection and Testing of Electronic Parts: XRF, Radiography, Decapsulation and Criteria for Acceptance or Rejection

A new class has been added to InterCEPT’s suite of counterfeit inspection and testing of electronic parts study course. TM-03 provides an in-depth discussion of XRF, radiography and decapsulation associated with detecting counterfeit electronic parts. It references the SAE AS6171 requirements for external visual inspection and includes video footage and images from a test lab to help the student understand how these tests are performed. Device images are reviewed so that the student can recognize the indicators of counterfeit or sub-standard electronic components and understand the criteria for acceptance and rejection.



The course covers:

• Overview of Test Methods
  • XRF – X-Ray Fluorescence
  • Radiography
  • Decapsulation
• Equipment needed
• How to perform the test, including on-site video and step-by-step instructions
  • Criteria for Acceptance
  • Criteria for Rejection
• Content of Test Reports
• Additional Considerations:
  • Equipment costs
  • Training considerations
  • Outsourcing the test

Students completing the class will:

• Understand the terminology for XRF – X-Ray Fluorescence, radiography and decapsulation while performing counterfeit mitigation testing of electronic parts.
• Understand how to perform the tests.
• Understand the criteria for acceptance and rejection.
• Understand the content of the test report.
• Assess additional considerations including cost, training and outsourcing options.

The class is best suited for individuals with quality, inspection and testing, purchasing, and sales responsibilities. Students taking TM-03 are expected to have a working knowledge of what a counterfeit part is and where counterfeit parts come from. If you do not have sufficient background knowledge, InterCEPT recommends completion of CF-01: A Historical Overview of Counterfeit Electronic Part Activity: The Risk, Response, and Solution and TM-01: Counterfeit Inspection and Testing of Electronic Parts: Test Methods Overview.

Click here to register for TM-03

If your organization is an ERAI Member, you can benefit from receiving data via ERAI’s “Data Connect” subscription service. The ERAI High Risk and Suspect Counterfeit Parts Database and Reported Companies Database can be customized to make it accessible to an ERAI Member’s internal operating system or software and is provided via FTP direct upload or an e-mail feed.

FTP Direct Upload Option

ERAI High Risk and Suspect Counterfeit Parts: This service is for users that do not want to use the one-per request query routine on the ERAI website and want to establish more comprehensive cross-checking within their system. In this option, ERAI will upload an up-to-date parts list that includes all of the parts in the ERAI High Risk and Suspect Counterfeit Parts Database on a daily basis to an FTP address specified by the client. The database file includes the part numbers, manufacturer information, lot codes and date codes of the reported parts, and the date the part was reported. It also identifies the status of the part (Suspect Counterfeit or Nonconforming or Suspect Counterfeit/Nonconforming) and a link to the detailed profile of the reported part inside the www.erai.com website including images, reports and descriptions of non-conformance.

ERAI Reported Companies Data: In this option, ERAI will upload an up-to-date list of all companies that have at least one ERAI Alert issued against them on a daily basis to an FTP address specified by the client. The database file includes the company name, company aliases (aka), headquarters city and country, indicates if a company has multiple locations, and cage code and provides a direct link to the detailed profile of the reported company inside the ERAI website.

E-mail Option

ERAI High Risk and Suspect Counterfeit Parts: ERAI will provide a master list of part numbers in the ERAI High Risk and Suspect Counterfeit Parts Database. Then, on a daily basis, ERAI will e-mail updates that include only parts reported that day by ERAI.

ERAI Reported Companies Data: An initial email will contain a master list of all the companies reported by ERAI. From then on, an update is sent on a daily basis containing the following fields: Company Name, Alternate Company Names, Headquarters City, Headquarters Country, Multiple Locations (Y/N), Cage Code, Is Reported (Y/N), and a link to their profile in the ERAI website.

Fees

The annual subscription for “ERAI Data Connect” can be waived if your company meets certain eligibility requirements and agrees to become an “ERAI Data Share” Subscriber. For further details on fees and becoming a Data Share Subscriber, please contact Richard Smith at rsmith@erai.com or at +239-261-6268.

Avnet-Alibaba Pact Alters Distribution Landscape
https://www.eetimes.com/avnet- alibaba- pact- alters- distribution- landscape/

Planting Tiny Spy Chips in Hardware Can Cost as Little as $200
https://www.wired.com/story/plant- spy- chips- hardware- supermicro- cheap- proof- of- concept/

Cybersecurity Firm Details How China Hacked Western Firms to Steal Aviation Tech
https://www.theepochtimes.com/cybersecurity- firm- details- how- china- hacked- western- firms- to- steal- aviation- tech_ 3118899.html

Some U.S. Electronics Factories Start Layoffs as Trade Tariffs Hit
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us- usa- trade- electronics- survey/some- u- s- electronics- factories- start- layoffs- as- trade- tariffs- hit- idUKKBN1X21ER

White House Tech Chiefs Preview 2020 Cyber Initiatives
https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2019/10/white- house- tech- chiefs- preview- 2020- cyber- initiatives/160857/

Supplier Realignment Prompts Supply Chain Anxiety
https://epsnews.com/2019/11/14/supplier- realignment- prompts- supply- chain- anxiety/

Distributors in China Are Bracing for Life Without TI
https://www.eetindia.co.in/news/article/Distributors- in- China- Are- Bracing- for- Life- Without- TI

China Has Always Trailed the U.S. in Chipmaking. In the Trade War Era, Will It Finally Catch Up?
https://fortune.com/2019/11/15/us- china- trade- war- semiconductor- chips/

In Need of Direction: The Case for Moving Supply Chains Out of China
https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/in- need- of- direction- the- case- for- moving- supply- chains- out- of- china/

US Government Extends Huawei Reprieve for a Further 90 Days
https://ausdroid.net/2019/11/19/us- government- extends- huawei- reprieve- for- a- further- 90- days- issues- no- licences- rattles- sabre- about- national- security/

Samsung to Invest an Extra $8 Billion in China Chip Plant: Media
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-samsung-china/samsung-to-invest-an-extra-8-billion-in-china-chip-plant-media-idUSKBN1YG1GM

Honeywell, iTRACE And SecureMarking Combat Counterfeit Activity In Aerospace With Blockchain
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/honeywell- itrace- securemarking- combat- counterfeit- 130000509.html

The Ins and Outs of the Supply Chain in 2019
https://www.eetasia.com/news/article/The- Ins- and- Outs- of- the- Supply- Chain- in- 2019